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COMMENTS
FOCUSING ON INFRINGEMENT:
WHY LIMITATIONS ON DECRYPTION
TECHNOLOGY ARE NOT THE
SOLUTION TO POLICING COPYRIGHT
INTRODUCTION
J bn wfsz tvsqsjtfe uibu zpv xfou up uif uspvcmf pg efdjqifsjoh
uijt qbsbhsbqi. Xijmf tjnqmf mfuufs tvctujuvujpo jt usjwjbmmz fbtz
up csfbl, uif qspdftt pg fodpejoh boe efdpejoh uif mbohvbhf ifsf cz
iboejt ufejpvt bu cftu. Uif sftu pg uif Dpnnfou.tipvme ibwf cffo fop-
vhi up vbso zpv uibu J eje opu ibwf bozuijoh jnqpsubou up tbz. Tpnf
dpnnfoubupst ibwf tubufe uibu uif wbtu nbkpsjuz pg mbx sfwjfx
bsujdmft bsf hjccfsjti.1 J bn qspve up tubuf uibu, uispvhi uijt
qbsbhsbqi, J ibwf qspwjefe uif gjstu mjufsbm fybnqmf pg uijt.
The above paragraph is a portion of this article that the author
has chosen not to share with the casual reader of this article. If you
desire access to the above material, it is required that you contact the
Case Western Reserve Law Review for permission and the decryption
process. You may decide it is not worth the effort to do so and sim-
ply ignore the opening paragraph. If so, you are now in the position
of having lawfully obtained this copyrighted material yet without any
way to access its content. You may instead decide to decipher the
relatively simple encoding yourself and read the encoded text. Such
an act would subject you to civil liability under United States ("U.S.")
law.2 An attempt to obtain the decryption key from a previous "licen-
see" of the Law Review would be equally problematic; both parties
would be subject to liability in such a case. In fact, there is presently
no legal way to read the opening paragraph without first gaining the
Law Review's permission.
1 See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, The World's Greatest Law Review Article (1995), at
http://www.lawhaha.com/review_.2.asp.
2 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).
3 Seeid.
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The above example may seem ridiculous, but under the recently
passed Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), 4 as a copyright
owner, the Law Review has sweeping rights to control access to its
copyrighted works, even for those possessing lawful copies of them.
On March 6, 2002, the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") Copyright Treaty entered into force for the U.S. and
twenty-nine other contracting nations.5 The treaty was intended to
update world copyright law in response to challenges presented by
digital technology. Article 11 of this treaty requires each member
nation to enact legislation to "provide adequate legal protection and
effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective tech-
nological measures that are used by authors in connection with the
exercise of their rights."6 The DMCA represents the implementation
of this statute under U.S. law.
The effects of Article 11 may be more extensive than was origi-
nally intended by the contracting nations. Already, Article 11 and its
progeny have engendered a considerable amount of controversy, es-
pecially in the community of encryption researchers. The U.S., as the
home of many of the largest producers of copyrighted works, was one
of the driving forces behind the inclusion of Article 11 in the 1996
WIPO Copyright Treaty.7 As a result, the DMCA has been the model
for the laws of many of the contracting nations, 8 and a source of un-
ease for citizens of a number of other nations.9
Given the strong influence of the DMCA in shaping international
copyright law, Part I of this Comment conducts a detailed analysis of
4 Id.
5 See WIPO Press Release PR/2001/300, 30th Accession to Key Copyright Treaty Paves
Way for Entry Into Force (discussing briefly the history and significance of the treaty), avail-
able at http://www.wipo.org/pressroom/en/index.html (Dec. 6, 2001).
6 See WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, Art. 11, reprinted in PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS ON INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY 177 (2000).
7 See Peter Jaszi, Taking the White Paper Seriously, (noting that the U.S. submitted draft
language for Art. 11), available at http://lcweb.loc.gov/nac/nac3O/jaszi-l.html (last visited Mar.
6,2002).
8 See, e.g., Copyright and Neighboring Rights Act, SG No. 28/2000 (2000) Art. 97(6)
(Bulgarian criminal provision broadly prohibiting circumvention of protected works); Council
Directive 2001/29, Art. 6(2), 2001 O.J. (L 167) (describing prohibited devices in terms similar
to 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(2)).
9 See, e.g., Niels Ferguson, Censorship in Action: Why I Don't Publish My HDCP Re-
sults, at http://www.macfergus.com /niels/dmca/cia.html (Aug. 15, 2001) (explaining the reluc-
tance of a Dutch cryptographer to publish his work for fear of liability under the DMCA); Denis
Kelleher, Confusion Over Copyright and Free Speech, THE IRISH TIMES (Aug. 27, 2001) (ex-
pressing author's fear that a U.S. disregard for free speech rights in computer programs might
set a poor precedent for the European Community) available at http://www.ireland.coml news-
paper/computimesl2001/0827/comp2.htm; Anand Parthasarathy, Clash of Cryptography and
Copyright, THE HINDU (Sept. 13, 2001) (expressing concern over the breadth and international
reach of the DMCA) available at http:llwww.hindunet.comlthehindul200l/09/13/storiesl
0813009. htm.
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the statute and its likely effects on encryption research. Part If con-
siders the general consequences of granting exceptional protection to "
encryption processes as incident to the copyright of an underlying
work. Such protection constitutes a new, unique species of intellec-
tual property and a sharp departure from the traditional limitations
placed on intellectual property monopolies under U.S. law. Finally,
Part III presents alternative models for providing protection to techno-
logically protected works.
I. THE DIGrrAL MiLLENNwm COPYRIGHT ACT
A. The Anti-Circumvention Provisions
Under § 1201(a) of the DMCA, 10 no person may "circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work pro-
tected under [U.S. copyright law]."" To circumvent a technological
measure is broadly defined as "to descramble a scrambled work, to
decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove,
deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of
the copyright owner."'12 The definition of effective control is equally
broad; a technological measure 'effectively controls access to a work'
if, "in the ordinary course of its operation, [it] requires the application
of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the
copyright owner, to gain access to the work."'
13
Unfortunately, the statute does not make clear what the term
"technological measure" signifies. It might be assumed that as a part
of the DMCA, the anti-circumvention provision applies only to digital
measures, but further prohibitions within § 1201 apply solely to ana-
log devices, 14 casting doubt on this argument. Webster's New World
Dictionary defines technical as "having to do with the useful or indus-
trial arts or skills."'i Under this definition, a technological measure
could be literally anything that restricts access to the work, even the
mechanically applied shrink wrap on the outside of a compact disc
("CD") or digital versatile discs ("DVD"). At least one court has
stated in dicta that "the statute is clear that it prohibits 'any technol-
ogy,' not simply black boxes."' 6
'0 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
" Idi § 1201(a)(1)(A).
'2 Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
'" AL § 1201(a)(3)(B).14 See id. § 1201(k).
15 WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY: BASIC SCHOOL EDITION 764 (Southwestern
Co. 1984).
16 Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 317 n.135 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
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Given the context of the statute, however, it would seem likely
that the "technological measures" discussed in § 1201 would be re-
stricted to encryption measures, scrambling systems, and similar pro-
tective devices. The legislative record bears out this theory, stating
that the coverage under the statute would be limited to "measures that
would be deemed to effectively control access to a work would be
those based on encryption, scrambling, authentication, or some other
measures which requires the use of a 'key' provided by a copyright
owner to gain access to a work."
' 17
The question remains, however, how effective a protective meas-
ure must be to gain protection under the statute. There is no require-
ment under the statute that the measure be novel or meet certain stan-
dards of effectiveness. Accordingly, it appears that literally any at-
tempt at encryption by a copyright owner, even through use of a tech-
nique in the public domain, garners protection under the statute. At
least one court has found that the strength of an encryption method is
irrelevant in determining its protection under the DMCA.' 8 Under
this ruling, even the simplistic coding used in the opening paragraph
of this Comment qualifies for protection.
In § 1201(a)(2) and § 1201(b), the DMCA further prohibits the
"manufactur[ing], import[ing], offer[ing] to the public, provi[ding], or
otherwise [trafficking] in any technology, product, service, device,
component, or part thereof,"' 9 falling within three categories. Before
turning to the individual categories, it is worth mentioning the "or
part thereof' language contained within this provision. This provi-
sion does not just apply to specific circumvention devices, but liter-
ally to "any part" of the decryption technology. Neither the statute
nor the case law makes clear precisely how far this "any part" lan-
guage may extend. The bare language, however, would extend the
publication of information about the encryption theory used within a
particular measure. Courts have shown a willingness to interpret the
provision broadly. For example, the bare, uncompiled source code of
a decryption program has been found to fall within the terms of the
statute.20 Would suggesting the vulnerability of a particular encryp-
tion scheme to brute force decryption within the context of an article
constitute publicizing "a part" of a decryption technology? Until this
17 144 CONG. REC. E2136, 2137 (1998) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
'8 See Universal City Studios, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 318 (citing RealNetworks, Inc. v.
Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000))
(stating that a method that otherwise meets statutory requirements falls under the statute regard-
less of whether it is a "strong means of protection").
19 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), §1201(b)(1) (2000).
20 See Universal City Studios, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 346 (holding that DMCA applies to
technology that circumvents the protection system of digital versatile disks).
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question, and others like it, is answered, the DMCA will have a chill-
ing effect on speech and research within the field of cryptography.
Returning to the protected categories under the provision, the first
concerns devices "primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls ac-
cess to a work protected under [U.S. copyright law]." 21 Thus, any
device, no matter how it is manufactured (i.e., reverse engineering, or
independent discovery of an encryption method), which is designed,
primarily to allow access to protected works, may not be manufac-
tured or sold without the permission of the copyright owner utilizing
the encryption. The implications of this will be discussed further be-
low.
2
A second category of prohibited devices encompasses devices
"marketed by [the provider of the device] or another acting in concert
with [the provider] with [the provider's] knowledge for use in cir-
cumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access
to a work protected under [U.S. copyright law]."' '  This provision
allows copyright owners to bring suit against anyone within the chain
of distribution so long as their marketing techniques indicate knowl-
edge of the circumvention function of the product. Practically speak-
ing, it allows the copyright owner who finds a circumvention device
for sale that applies to her product to both save the expense of track-
ing down the actual creator of the device and seek out the proverbial
"deep pocket" within the chain of distribution. It should be noted that
under this provision, neither the purpose of the design of the device,
nor any significant commercial purposes it may possess are relevant
in determining a violation of the statute. It is only necessary that it be
marketed for use in circumventing access control measures protected
under the statute, and that a person "trafficking" in the device be
aware of this.
Given that at least one court has broadly defined trafficking to in-
clude merely creating a hypertext link to a file,24 this provision could
implicate a number of seemingly legitimate activities. Under such a
9tandard, linking to a site offering to sell a cryptography text claiming
to demonstrate the shortcomings of a particular encryption system
may incur liability under this statute.
Finally, the third protected category covers devices that have
"only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to
21 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (2000).
22 See infra Part ll.B.
' 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(C) (2000).
24 See Universal City Studios, I I I F. Supp. 2d at 303,346.
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a work protected under [U.S. copyright law]."25 It should be noted
here that this provision affects any part of a decryption technology
that cannot be put to a significant commercial use. The statute is not
clear as to what constitutes a commercial use, but in the context of
fair use, at least, courts have defined "commercial use" broadly. 26
Consequently, articles, web page content, and encryption research
could possess a commercial use beyond their use in circumventing
access control measures.
B. Permitted Circumvention
In response to the broad sweep of the § 1201(a) and § 1201(b)
prohibitions, Congress included a number of narrow exceptions
within the statute. One narrow exception is limited to nonprofit li-
braries, archives, and educational institutions. 27  This exception
merely protects an institution's decryption of a work in violation of §
1201(a) in a good faith attempt to determine if it wishes to purchase a
work. 28 The exception does not apply where the institution can rea-
sonably access the work in another manner, and even where applica-
ble, the work may only be retained for a sufficient time to allow the
institution to evaluate the work.29 A broader exemption protects gov-
ernment entities and their officials acting in the scope of their duties.30
Neither exception is significant in limiting the DMCA's intrusion on
the public domain.
Section 1201 also contains a limited exception for reverse engi-
neering. 31 A person who "has lawfully obtained" rights of use for a
computer program may circumvent an access control measure without
liability under § 1201(a) or § 1201(b) under limited circumstances.32
Specifically, the individual may obtain access to analyze "those ele-
ments of the program that are necessary to achieve interoperability of
an independently created computer program with other programs. 33
The statute defines interoperability as "the ability of computer pro-
grams to exchange information, and to share the information which
2' 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(B) (2000).
26 See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 914 (2d Cir. 1994)
(defining commercial use to extend to the photocopying of eight articles in a scientific journal
for use by a researcher); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) (defining commercial use to include providing a "peer-to-peer file-sharing system
that allows users to conduct music file searches on other computer hard drives").
27 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (2000).
28 id.
29 Id.
30 Id. § 1201(e).
31 Id. § 1201(0.
32 Id.
33 Id. § 1201(0(1).
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has been exchanged." 34 This exception applies only if the individual
did not already have access to the elements of interest prior to the cir-
cumvention. Further, it provides a defense only to the anti-
circumvention provisions; the individual is still liable for any infring-
ing acts in ensuring interoperability. Information gained and technol-
ogy developed can only be shared with others to the extent it is neces-
sary to ensure the interoperability of the independently created pro-
gram with other programs.
Despite the broad wording, this exception remains fairly narrow.
The main limitation lies in the fact that the exception applies solely to
computer programs. There is no indication that the term "computer
program" includes digital data. In fact, a recent district court decision
specifically rules that the provision does not extend to such data.
While an individual adapting a program to a particular computer op-
erating system might be protected, an individual independently devel-
oping a DVD player would remain liable under § 1201(a) & (b). Fur-
ther, this statute does not protect reverse engineering, a program to
create a rival program or even for intellectual curiosity, but only for
purposes of interoperability. This greatly restricts the range of pro-
grams that may be subject to this exception.
Another exception exists for encryption research, defined as "ac-
tivities necessary to identify and analyze flaws and vulnerabilities of
encryption technologies applied to copyrighted works. ' 7  Such
activities may only qualify under the statute if they "are conducted to
advance the state of knowledge in the field of encryption technology
or to assist in the development of encryption products. 38 This defini-
tion is sufficiently broad; if all encryption research were allowable,
the statute would have little effect on such activities. Unfortunately,
not all the activities traditionally associated with encryption research
are exempted under the statute.
The statute lists several factors to be considered on whether a de-
fense of encryption research may exempt a researcher under the stat-
ute. First, a researcher is encouraged to promptly notify the copyright
owner of any results of his of her research.39 Although sharing one's
results with the party most affected by them is reasonable given the
general policy goal of improving and strefigthening encryption tech-
niques, under the present state of the law, such an action is tanta-
34 Id. § 1201(t)(2).
35 See id.
36 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(holding that DMCA applies to technology that circumvents the protection system of DVD).
17 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (2000).
38 Id. § 1201(g)(1)(A).
39 See id. § 1201(g)(3)(C).
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mount to an invitation to be sued. Accordingly, this factor may be
less indicative of the intent of the researcher than it is of the aggres-
siveness of the legal department of the copyright owner. Second, the
court must consider whether the researcher is employed or trained in
the field of cryptography.4° This factor might discourage work by
amateur or hobbyist cryptographers who lack formal credentials, but
it is only one factor to be considered. It certainly seems fair to at least
consider the prior work and training of those claiming to advance the
state of cryptography.Finally, the court must factor in the manner of distribution of the
results of the research. Specifically, the court must determine if they
have been distributed "in a manner reasonably calculated to advance
the state of ... encryption technology, [or] ... in a manner that fa-
cilitates infringement under this title or a violation of [other] applica-
ble law.",41 Under this factor, it would appear that publishing one's
work in a peer-reviewed journal would be a strong indication that re-
search was performed in the proper manner. As discussed below,
however, the very act of publishing the article may not be protected
under the exception.
Assuming the researcher prevails in the above analysis, the en-
cryption research exception exempts encryption researchers from li-
ability under § 1201(a) for circumventing access control measures on
copyrighted works, subject to four conditions. Two of these are quite
obvious; the encrypted copy must be legally obtained, 42 and the de-
cryption cannot constitute copyright infringement itself or otherwise
violate other federal law. 43 The others, however, are somewhat
vague. For example, the circumvention must be necessary for the
researcher to conduct his encryption research.44 The problem with
this apparently innocuous little clause lies in the fact that the exemp-
tion is an affirmative defense under the statute.45 The researcher
bears the burden of showing that his actions were necessary.
While showing that the decryption action was necessary to fur-
ther encryption research does not seem like a heavy burden, no court
has yet passed upon the meaning of "necessary" under the statute.
Hence, it could mean anything from a simple statement that only re-
search related decryption will be permitted to a threat of liability for
researchers unfortunate enough to overlook an alternate source for the
information. To pose a ridiculous example, a researcher circumvent-
40 See id. § 1201(g)(3)(B).
41 Id. § 1201(g)(3)(A).
42 See id. § 1201(g)(2)(A).
41 See id. § 1201(g)(2)(D).
44 See id. § 1201(g)(2)(B).
41 See id. § 1201(g)(2).
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ing access control measures on a DVD copy of the cartoon of Bambi
could have used a Snow White DVD using the same measures instead.
Thus, it was not strictly necessary to circumvent the access controls
on that Bambi when Snow White was available. A more plausible
example might be found in education; is it "necessary" for students to
tackle encryption schemes that have already been broken to
strengthen their grasp of the theory? If a researcher has reason to be-
lieve that two encryption schemes are similar, is it "necessary" to cir-
cumvent the first to better understand the second? While I believe
that any court would find the above three examples sufficient to con-
stitute necessity, I am not staking my reputation, my financial com-
fort, or my freedom on the result. An encryption researcher perform-
ing the research is risking all three with the initiation of each new pro-
ject.46 Even if a researcher were sure that she had complied with the
requirements of the statute, it is unlikely she would wish to expend
the time or money to be the test case for defining "necessary" under
the statute.
The final requirement for the encryption research exception re-
quires the researcher to make a good faith effort to obtain permission
from the copyright owner prior to decrypting the work.47 Even as-
suming that no difficulties arise in determining the copyright owner
of the underlying work, given the breadth of the DMCA, few re-
searchers will wish to call the attention of major copyright holders to
their research before it is even commenced. Such a request for per-
mission is likely to be answered with a "cease and desist" letter;
copyright owners have little to gain in allowing their access control
measures to be broken. Although copyright 6wners have shown some
willingness to work with researchers in the past, they have shown an
equal willingness to ensure that research on their product is per-
formed on their terms.48 This raises what is perhaps the most trouble-
some question raised by the requirement; if a copyright owner grants
permission to a researcher subject to terms such as a ban on publica-
tion or other secrecy requirements, must the researcher accept the
terms to meet the good faith requirement? How onerous can these
terms be? If this issue is not litigated in the case of Professor Fel-
ten,49 it almost certainly will be within the next few years. Again, no
researcher will be edger to become the test case for this issue, chilling
their work until its resolution.
46 See 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (2000) (imposing civil liability for willful violations of anti-
circumvention provisions); 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2000) (imposing criminal liability for violations
of anti-circumvention provisions).
47 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(2)(C) (2000).
48 See infra Part LC, notes 55-56.
49 See id.
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It should be noted that even where a researcher desiring to pub-
lish his or her work qualifies for the research exception, the exception
applies only to violations under § 1201(a). Therefore, even a bona
fide encryption researcher may be subject to liability under § 1201(b)
upon publishing for making available to the public a part of a tech-
nology primarily designed to circumvent an access control measure.
Although the language in § 1201(b) is virtually identical to the lan-
guage of §§ 1201(a)(2) and (3), the research exception applies only to
the former. Until this particular difficulty is resolved, it is unlikely
that a researcher will be confident in relying on this provision.
Another exception allows circumvention of access control meas-
ures on protected works when either the access control measures or
the protected work collect personal information about the user seek-
ing access without giving the user notification and an opportunity to
opt out of the collection.50 Given the unfortunate trend of software
distributors to include such capabilities in their works, 51 this excep-
tion is necessary to protect the privacy of copyright users. Unfortu-
nately, it does little to alleviate the problems discussed earlier.
The statue also contains an exception for bona fide security test-
ing of a computer. 52 The language of this exception is quite similar to
that of the encryption research exception, with many of the same
shortcomings. Like the encryption exception, this exception does not
apply to § 1201(b), making it illegal to disseminate the results of even
bona fide testing.53 Unlike encryption research, however, the need for
publication of security testing results is not as vital. While publica-
tion of the results can forewarn users of a program of its vulnerabili-
ties, they can just as easily facilitate attacks on these systems. Thus,
the failure to provide a dissemination exception here may be the wis-
est course of action under the statute.
C. International Effects of the DMCA
Even in those countries that have not ratified the WIPO Copy-
right Treaty, its terms may have a chilling effect on programmers and
encryption researchers. For example, nothing in the DMCA restricts
its civil or criminal penalties to American citizens. In fact, the first
50 17 U.S.C. § 1201(i) (2000).
51 See e.g., Rothken Law Firm Press Release, Fahrenheit Entertainment and Sunncomm
are Sued for Violating Privacy Rights of California Consumers and for Unfair Business Prac-
tices, available at http.//www.techfirm.com/mcrel.pdf (Sept. 6, 2001); Sara Robinson, CD Soft-
ware Is Said to Gather Data on Users, N.Y. TLMEs ABSTRACTS (Nov. 1, 1999), available at
1999 WL30547639.
12 17 U.S.C. § 12010) (2000).
53 See id.
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criminal prosecution instituted under the statute was brought against a
Russian national for acts committed while still in Russia.
54
In a widely publicized case, the U.S. Department of Justice
brought charges against a Russian programmer, Dmitri Sklyarov, for
his participation in the creation and distribution of a decryption pro-
gram known as the Advanced eBook Processor for his employer El-
comSoft.5 5 The Advanced eBook Processor allows a user to trans-
form eBooks in the proprietary Adobe eBook format into an ordinary
.pdf file. All of Sklyarov's work on the program and all of the busi-
ness related to its distribution were carried out in his native Russia.
His arrest took place while he was giving a talk in Las Vegas. The
complaint filed by the Department of Justice, although not directly
addressing jurisdictional issues, seems to have based jurisdiction on a
single sale of the Advanced eBook Processor to an Adobe execu-
tive.5
6
Sklyarov was finally released after a substantial wave of protest
over his detainment. His arrest, however, opens substantial questions
over the intended breadth of the DMCA. Under customary interna-
tional law, a nation may exercise jurisdiction over any act taking
place in its territory. Given the ubiquitous nature of the Internet,
however, any significant commercial distribution of a software prod-
uct will almost always take place, at least in part, within the territory
of the United States. This extends the reach of the statute to anyone
who visits the United States. Given the rapid spread of anti-
circumvention law intended to comply with Article 11, soon, internet
publishers and distributors will be reluctant to leave their home coun-
try for fear of being subjected to one of a number of broadly worded
paracopyright laws.
A prime example of this very fear is illustrated by the case of
Niels Ferguson, a prominent Dutch cryptography expert. Ferguson's
research has revealed a major flaw in Intel's encryption scheme for
firewall connections, the High-Bandwidth Digital Content Protection
System ("HBCP").57 Ferguson, however, refuses to publish his re-
sults for fear of liability under the DMCA.58 In his own words, "I
travel to the US regularly, both for professional and for personal rea-
sons. I simply cannot afford to be sued or prosecuted in the US. I
'4 See Editorial, Jailed Under a Bad Law, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2001), available at
httpi:/www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdynpagename=article&node=opinion&contentId=A38
463-200lAug20&notFound=true.
5' See id.
56 See Affidavit of Daniel J. O'Connell for Complaint at 8, United States v. Sklyarov,
(N.D. Cal. July 7, 2001) (No. 5-01-257) (alleging that an Adobe employee purchased a copy of
the Elcomsoft unlocking software over the Internet).
57 See Ferguson, supra note 9.
51 See id.
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would go bankrupt just paying for my lawyers. 59 Other cryptogra-
phy experts have also withdrawn their work from publication, citing
similar concerns. 6°
Although Ferguson's reaction may seem extreme, there is unfor-
tunately ample precedent to justify his concerns. A well-publicized
example can be found in the difficulties experienced by Dr. Edward
Felten and his colleagues in their attempt to publish a similar paper.61
Dr. Felten and his colleagues were participants in an open challenge
issued by The Secure Digital Music Initiative Foundation ("SDMI")
to cryptographic researchers and hackers to break a number of pro-
posed copy control measures implemented by SDMI. 62 SDMI pro-
vided each participant with samples for each of a number of tech-
nologies subject to a limited license agreement. 63 SDMI also pro-
vided a means for participants to check their solutions. 64 For each
successful answer, SDMI offered successful researchers $10,000 for
their research results. 65 Dr. Felten and his colleagues turned down the
offer, and instead retained rights to their research in accordance with
the license agreement. 66 Dr. Felten planned to publish his findings at
an encryption conference, but when his role in the conference was
publicized, SDMI responded with a cease and desist letter to both Dr.
Felten and the conference itself.67 Facing a lawsuit, the conference
declined to allow the presentation of Felten's paper.68 Dr. Felten and
his colleagues were forced to bring an action for declaratory judgment
to ensure their right to publish their results.69
II. A Focus ON PROTECTING TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTION
MEASURES GREATLY INCREASES THE SCOPE OF THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY MONOPOLY
The protections offered by Article 11 do not fall within the ru-
bric of copyright law. Article 11 protects encryption techniques di-
rectly as processes, not indirectly through their underlying code as an
59 id.
60 See, e.g., Brian McWilliams, Security Expert's DMCA Protest Rallies Supporters,
WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2001) (discussing Dug Song's withdrawal of his cryptography informa-
tion from his website), available at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/169829.html.
61 See EFF: Scientists Support Professor's Copyright Law Challenge, at
httpJlwww.newsforge.comlarticle.pl?sid--01/08/1410131222&mode=nocomment (Aug. 13,
2001).
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 See id.
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original work of authorship. Such protections have been more appro-
priately referred to as paracopyright; 70 instead of directly protecting
the rights granted to an author under the copyright provisions, anti-
circumvention provisions create rights incident to a copyright. These
ancillary rights are meant solely to grant copyright owners more lev-
erage in enforcing their copyright. Even one of the authors of the
DMCA acknowledges that the bill cannot be properly based upon the
Copyright Clause of the Constitution.7
A. The DMCA Extends Copyright Protection to Encryption Processes
Statutes such as the DMCA grant copyright owners unprece-
dented intellectual property rights in the access control measures pro-
tecting their works. To receive its protection, the DMCA requires
only that an access control measure "effectively controls access" to a
protected work.72 This standard is met by any measure which, "in the
ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of informa-
tion, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright
owner, to gain access to the work., 73 There is no standard of novelty
that must be shown to receive this protection. Accordingly, even
though the statute extends this protection to processes, traditionally
beyond the bounds of copyright law,74 it lacks the controls found in
patent law that limit the withdrawal of processes from the public do-
main.
Focusing on U.S. intellectual property law, the scope of protec-
tion granted anti-circumvention measures under the DMCA appears
similar to that granted for a trade secret. The statute protects access
control measures from misappropriation by outside parties. It does
not explicitly prevent others from independently practicing the pro-
tected method. On its face, the DMCA merely extends federal protec-
tion to subject matter already protected by state trade secret laws.
Two important differences, however, expand the scope of protection
granted by the DMCA well beyond that of prior law.
The first, and most obvious, difference lies in the definition of
circumvention. Basically, any attempt to gain access to the content of
a protected work is prohibited, if it is done "without the authority of
70 See 144 CONG. REC. E2136, 2137 (1998) (discussing paracopyright as an area of regu-
lation that covers activities falling outside the intellectual property realm).
71 See id. at 2136 (discussing how the Copyright Clause is traditionally used to regulate
"the use of information-not the devices... by which the information is delivered").
72 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (2000).
7' Id § 1201(a)(3)(B).
74 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (stating that copyright protection does not extend to such
measures).
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the copyright owner." 75 State trade secret laws typically require some
form of misappropriation of a trade secret to create liability.76 The
ordinary trade secret case invariably involves employee misconduct
or some immoral or illegal act by the competition. A competitor or
even a third party who gains access to a trade secret by innocent
means can generally practice or publish the trade secret without re-
percussion.77 The clichd example of this is the hypothetical of the
man walking by the headquarters of Coca-Cola® and picking up a
piece of paper off of the sidewalk with the famous recipe for Coke®
written upon it. Few state laws will prevent the man from doing as he
wishes with the formally secret formula, as trade secret protection
dissipates when the secret leaves its owner's control.
Under the DMCA, however, such innocent discovery does not
destroy protection. If the secret cola formula in the above hypotheti-
cal is replaced with encryption keys or source code relating to a DVD
encryption scheme, its finder must now take great care in how he
treats the information. He cannot, for example, use the discovered
encryption keys to watch his legally owned DVD on a non-compliant
player, as this would circumvent an access control measure without
the authorization of the copyright owner. 78 He would be further pro-
hibited from publishing the material or showing it to a friend with an
interest in cryptography. 79 To take an extreme example, under a lit-
eral interpretation of the statute, our hypothetical finder could be sub-
jected to liability even for merely returning the slip of paper to the
sidewalk upon which he found it, as this could be interpreted as pro-
viding the work to the public.
While the above example provides a trivial case, the DMCA also
prevents a more substantial variety of innocent discovery, reverse en-
gineering. Traditionally, trade secret law did not protect the use of a
lawfully obtained sample of a product to determine its composition or
method of manufacture. 80  This provides a significant limitation on
trade secret law; although protection was easily obtained and theoreti-
cally infinite in duration, it could not prevent a product from reveal-
75 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (2000).
76 See E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1970)
(holding that aerial photography of a competitor's plant construction is actionable misappropria-
tion of a trade secret).
77 See Vacco Indus. v. Van den Burg, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 602, 611 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting
that trade secret protection rests upon the theory of improper acquisition).
78 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2000).
79 See id. § 1201(a)(2).
80 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (stating that trade
secret law doesn't protect "against discovery by fair and honest means" such as "independent
intervention" or "accidental disclosure").
1104 [Vol. 52:1091
FOCUSING ON INFRINGEMENT
ing its secrets once it had reached the market. Accordingly, the pro-
tected information would eventually enter the public domain.
Processes protected under the DMCA, however, can never enter
the public domain unless they are abandoned by the copyright owner.
With limited exceptions, reverse engineering of access control meas-
ures protected by the DMCA is prohibited. 8' Even if by some acci-
dent information relating to the access control measure is lawfully
obtained, the DMCA prevents public distribution or use of the infor-
mation. 82 Like the holder of a patent, a copyright owner protecting an
access control measure under the DMCA can prevent the unauthor-
ized use of its encryption methods. This protection, however, is of
limited duration and is not circumscribed by a claim to outline the
limits of the protection. In this respect, the protection granted to these
encryption programs is significantly greater than that granted to the
circuitry used to implement them. Allowing this degree of protection
over unproven encryption schemes would significantly retard pro-
gress within the field.
B. The DMCA Extends Copyright Protection to Devices Related to the
Copyrighted Work
A focus on protecting access control measures will also invaria-
bly lead to the inclusion of devices utilizing the copyrighted work
within the copyright monopoly. Specifically, so long as the copyright
owner has the sole power to grant access to a protected work, any re-
lated device intended to provide access to the work falls under the
control of the copyright owner. While an individual copyright owner
has little power to affect the market for such goods, large copyright
owners, working in tandem, can easily extend their access control
rights to control the production of any such licensed goods. Unfortu-
nately, this is not mere speculation; major copyright owners in the
U.S. have already formed similar organizations to ensure the licensing
of playback devices. Examples include the DVD Copy Control Asso-
ciation and the Secure Digital Music Initiative, formed by the major
copyright holders in the video and audio industries.
While copyright owners could attempt such control without ex-
tensive legal protection of access control measures, their bargaining
position in licensing such measures would be sharply curtailed. In the
absence of access control measures, any prospective manufacturer
could develop its own circumvention method to create a playback
device. If nothing else, a manufacturer could reverse engineer an ex-
s' See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(0 (2000).82 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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isting system to gain the necessary encryption algorithms. Accord-
ingly, the cost of a license from the copyright owners would never
exceed the cost of independent development of a decryption system.
Thus, providing direct protection of access control measures consti-
tutes a gift to copyright owners of the value of playback devices and
other devices related to the use of their copyrighted works.
There has always been a conflict in U.S. intellectual property law
between the desire to encourage and reward creativity and the fear of
granting monopoly power. U.S. law has always sharply limited the
scope of granted monopolies over intellectual property. Any attempt
to expand an intellectual property monopoly beyond these carefully
defined domains violates the purpose of intellectual property law; the
increase of new ideas in public discourse. As Justice Stevens once
observed, Congress views its role in enacting a copyright law as fol-
lows, "Congress must consider ... two questions: First, how much
will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public;
and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to
the public? '' 83 Any extension of intellectual property rights is reason-
able only so far as it works to enrich the public domain.
This viewpoint, while not unique to U.S. law, is not necessarily
the norm. In many European countries, intellectual property rights,
especially copyright, are considered the automatic property of their
creator, his or hers by moral right. U.S. intellectual property law re-
jects this theory. The U.S. recognizes only limited moral rights in
copyrighted works.84 Intellectual property rights are granted solely by
the mandate of the U.S. Constitution only to further the development
of the useful arts.85 It is nothing but a bribe for the talented, meant to
encourage the free flow of ideas to the public.
The U.S. common law aversion to extension of the intellectual
property monopoly finds its voice in the doctrines of patent and copy-
right misuse. American courts have responded to attempts to extend
the monopoly granted to a protected work by temporarily negating the
granted protection.86 For example, a copyright or patent holder is
83 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 n.10 (1984)
(quoting H. R. REP. No. 2222, at 7 (1909)).
84 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000) (stating that one has a right to "claim authorship" of one's
work).
85 See, e.g., Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429 n.10 (opining that "[tihe enactment of copyright
legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right
that the author has in his writings .... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be
served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for lim-
ited periods the exclusive rights to their writings") (quoting H. R. REP. NO. 2222, at 7 (1909)).
86 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Lasercomb
America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that a copyright owner
was barred from suing for copyright infringement where it had misused the copyright).
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prohibited from including anticompetitive clauses in standard licens-
ing agreements 87 or attempting to control the market for staple articles
of commerce related to the product. 88 So long as he or she attempts
to do so, the court will not enforce their intellectual property rights.89
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Tech-
nolgies, Inc.90 illustrates the reluctance of U.S. courts to extend the
copyright monopoly to related devices. DGI Technologies was found
to have infringed upon Alcatel's copyright in its software in develop-
ing a microprocessor for. a telephone switching system compatible
with Alcatel software. The court of appeals, however, vacated the
injunction granted by the trial court, finding that Alcatel had misused
the copyright over its software in attempting to extend its protection
to its unpatented microprocessor. In accepting the doctrine of copy-
right misuse, the court observed that "whereas 'copyright law [seeks]
to increase the store of human knowledge and arts by rewarding...
authors with the exclusive rights to their works for a limited time...,
the granted monopoly power does not extend to property not covered
by the... copyright."' 91 Unfortunately, under the DMCA, the limits
of the monopoly grant will no longer be so sharply defined. Material
more properly the subject of trade secret or patent can now be legally
tied to a copyrighted work, but is tied by statute, so long as it contains
a minimally effective access control measure.
III. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR DETERRING MASS COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT IN THE DIGrrAL AGE
A. Limit the Scope of Anti-Circumvention Statutes to Prevent
Excessive Encroachment on the Public Domain and Scientific
Discourse
Not all anti-encryption statutes are as restrictive as the DMCA.
Perhaps the best statute compatible with obligations under Article 11
comes from Japan. Article 120bis, prohibits by criminal penalty the
manufacture, importation, or public offer of any device, kit to assem-
ble a device, or computer program "having a principal function for
the circumvention of technological protection measures." 92 The stat-
87 See Lasercomb America, Inc., 911 F.2d at 979.
" See Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 451-453 (holding that including anticompetitive
clauses in a standard licensing agreement is a misuse of a copyright).
"9 See id. at 978-79.
90 166 F.3d 772 (5thCir 1999).
91 Id. at 793 (quoting Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970,976 (4th Cir.
1990)).
92 See Copyright Law, Law No. 101 of 1998, art 120bis, no. i., available at
http'Jclea.wipo.inttlpbinllpext.dllIlealLipEN/25b4b/2709b?f-file[documenttm] (last visited
April 15,2002).
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ute defines technological protection measures broadly, including all
"measures to prevent or deter such acts as constitute infringements on
moral rights or copyright.., or neighboring rights."93 Circumvention
is defined as "enabl[ing] ... acts prevented by technological protec-
tion measures or to [ceasing] obstruction to the results of acts deterred
by such measures, by removal or alteration of signals used for such
measures." 94 The removal or alteration of a signal necessitated by
conversion between recording or transmission systems does not con-
stitute circumvention under this statute.95 Article 120bis further pro-
hibits any business from offering circumvention of technological pro-
tection measures to the public as a service.
96
Perhaps the most laudable feature of this provision is its limita-
tion of the scope of the statute to devices and computer programs.
Unlike the U.S. statute, which encompasses technologies and parts
thereof, the Japanese statute requires a tangible circumvention meas-
ure to find liability. No reasonable interpretation of the Japanese
statute could broaden it to encompass the dissemination of the results
of cryptographic research. Although some programmers might balk
at the "program" provision, claiming that source code is a necessary
means of expressing cryptographic findings, 97 on the whole, the law
protects expression in that area quite nicely.
The Japanese statute also differs from the DMCA in its refusal to
simply prohibit the circumvention of a technological protection
measure. Researchers can freely circumvent measures, so long as
they do not manufacture devices based upon the results. It even ap-
pears that programs written to circumvent technological protection
measures are not forbidden under the statute, so long as they are not
distributed. Although the English translation of the statute is a poor
vehicle for attempting fine shades of distinction, the statute forbids
the manufacture and importation of copies of a program.98 This im-
plies that the prohibited manufacturing activity would involve the
reproduction of a successful program, not its original creation. Re-
gardless of whether this is an accurate reflection of Japanese law, in-
cluding such a distinction in a revised U.S. law would be helpful in
encouraging legitimate cryptographic research.
9' Id. art. 2(l)(xx).
94 Id. art. 30(1)(ii).
95 See id.
96 Id. art. 120bis (ii).
97 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, Inc., I I1 F. Supp. 2d 294, 305-06
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
98 See Copyright Law, Law No. 101 of 1998, art 120bis, no. i., available at
http://clea.wipo.int IpbinIlpext.dIIll/ea/LipEN/25b4b/2709b?f-file[document.htm] (last visited
April 15, 2002).
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Finally, the Japanese statute may provide an answer to the over-
expansion of the copyright monopoly discussed above. The Japanese
provision bans the distribution of devices whose primary purpose is to
circumvent technological protection measures in the course of ena-
bling acts prevented by the statute. Since the legitimate owner of a
copy of a copyrighted work generally has the right to use that copy, a
device, such as a CD or DVD player, that merely allows access to the
work does not have the primary purpose of circumventing protections
under the statute. By this reasoning, a manufacturer could legally
reverse engineer the technological protections in a licensed playback
device so long as she complied with all other applicable laws. She
could then manufacture a playback device of her own and distribute
it, so long as it did not operate to make additional copies of a work or
otherwise facilitate copyright infringement. This system eliminates
much of the overbreadth of copyright under the DMCA.
B. Prevent the Distribution of Decryption Devices Incapable of
Substantial Non-Infringing Uses Under the Doctrine of Contributory
Infringement
While the Japanese statute does an admirable job of limiting the
scope of the copyright monopoly, it still fails to address the basic
problem of paracopyright statutes, as they do not focus on infringe-
ment. By creating rights incident to a copyright, paracopyright law
imposes the burden of protecting copyrighted works upon the general
public. The purpose of Article 11 is to prevent the dissemination of
devices and programs to the public that serve no purpose except to
facilitate infringement. In the digital environment, these devices have
taken the form of the decryption technologies bannd by the DMCA,
but copyright law has weathered the introduction of new technologies
for decades before the Internet. Each time a new technology has
arisen, courts have managed to strike a proper balance without the
need for paracopyright restrictions. Digital technology is no differ-
ent; a proper balance can be found in the existing doctrine of con-
tributory infringement.
Under U.S. law, a claim of contributory infringement has three
elements.99 First, there must be an act of direct infringement. 100 Even
behavior that is likely to induce or assist an infringing activity is not
tortious unless an infringement results.' 0' Second, the contributory
infringer must either actively induce the act of infringement or pro-
99 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT §§ 6.0-6.1 (2d ed. 1996).
100 See id.
101 Seeid
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vide a product that facilitates such an infringement.' °2 Finally, the
contributory infringer must have knowledge of the infringing activity.
Where a defendant provides the raw materials for bootleg copies,
programs to break into an encrypted file, or devices that facilitate
copying, he can substantially aid in the infringing activity without any
direct involvement. This makes it difficult to make the requisite
showing of knowledge. Even a defendant who intended to profit
from the infringing uses of its product may not be aware of a specific
infringing activity. If actual knowledge of a specific infringing activ-
ity was required, manufacturers of infringing items would maintain a
policy of willful blindness, effectively insulating themselves from any
liability. Thus, the defendant's knowledge of infringing activity may
be assumed where the article is incapable of any substantial non-
infringing use.10 3
Application of the contributory infringement doctrine can be
problematic, but it allows copyright owners to prevent the dissemina-
tion of devices useful mainly for privacy, while avoiding unnecessary
encroachments on the public domain. To provide one example,
unlike the DMCA, liability under the contributory infringement doc-
trine, by definition, cannot occur without an actual act of infringe-
ment. Secondly, since technologies with substantial non-infringing
use are protected under the doctrine, socially useful uses of decryp-
tion technology will remain protected. Security testing, encryption
research, and similar activities would be excluded without the need
for complicated exceptions. Additionally, this standard allows inde-
pendent manufactures to create devices to utilize the protected mate-
rial, restricting the copyright monopoly to its intended limits, the pro-
tected work.
CONCLUSION
There is no question that stronger copyright protection is neces-
sary given the advances in digital technology. Paracopyright meas-
ures such as Article 11 and the DMCA, however, are not an efficient
vehicle for policing the use of copyright on digital media. Directly
protecting access control measures on copyrighted works chills aca-
'02 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c), held unconstitutional on other grounds, (2001) (stating that
one is liable for "actively inducing infringement" or offers to sell products that facilitate such
infringement).
103 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 425-27
(1984) (declining to find liability for manufacturer of home video tape recorders ("VTRs")
where VTRs had both infringing and non-infringing uses); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that provider of service permitting and facili-
tating transmission and retention of digital audio files by its users was liable because it had
"actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its system").
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demic speech in the field of encryption and grants too great an expan-
sion of the copyright monopoly at the expense of the public. Properly
applied, existing law in the field of contributory infringement law is
sufficient to protect the interests of copyright holders even consider-
ing the increasing ease with which information can be transferred.
Failing a return to the contributory infringement approach, an revision
of the DMCA to adopt an anti-circumvention provision similar to Ja-
pan's would reduce much of its encroachment into the public domain
without reducing its effectiveness in protecting copyrighted works.
Copyright is a bargain, between the public and our authors, art-
ists, and musicians. We give up a portion of our freedom to induce
them to enrich the public discourse with their creations. Paracopy-
right provisions such as Article 11 and the DMCA shift the terms of
this bargain away from its original balance. They place a greater bur-
den on the public without generating a corresponding benefit. As dif-
ficult as it must be to protect one's ivorks in an age where information
can circumscribe the globe in seconds, there has to be a better way.
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